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Bayesian Statistics Then and Now1
Andrew Gelman
It is always a pleasure to hear Brad Efron’s thoughts
on the next century of statistics, especially consid-
ering the huge influence he has had on the field’s
present state and future directions, both in model-
based and nonparametric inference.
THREE META-PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS
Before going on, I would like to state three meta-
principles of statistics which I think are relevant to
the current discussion.
First, the information principle, which is that the
key to a good statistical method is not its underlying
philosophy or mathematical reasoning, but rather
what information the method allows us to use. Good
methods make use of more information. This can
come in different ways: in my own experience (fol-
lowing the lead of Efron and Morris, 1971, among
others), hierarchical Bayes allows us to combine dif-
ferent data sources and weight them appropriately
using partial pooling. Other statisticians find para-
metric Bayes too restrictive: in practice, paramet-
ric modeling typically comes down to conventional
models such as the normal and gamma distributions,
and the resulting inference does not take advantage
of distributional information beyond the first two
moments of the data. Such problems motivate more
elaborate models, which raise new concerns about
overfitting, and so on.
As in many areas of mathematics, theory and prac-
tice leapfrog each other: as Efron notes, empirical
Bayes methods have made great practical advances
but “have yet to form into a coherent theory.” In
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the past few decades, however, with the work of
Lindley and Smith (1972) and many others, empir-
ical Bayes has been folded into hierarchical Bayes,
which is part of a coherent theory that includes in-
ference, model checking, and data collection (at least
in my own view, as represented in chapters 6 and
7 of Gelman et al., 2003). Other times, theoretical
and even computational advances lead to practical
breakthroughs, as Efron illustrates in his discussion
of the progress made in genetic analysis following
the Benjamini and Hochberg paper on false discov-
ery rates.
My second meta-principle of statistics is the method-
ological attribution problem, which is that the many
useful contributions of a good statistical consultant,
or collaborator, will often be attributed to the statis-
tician’s methods or philosophy rather than to the
artful efforts of the statistician himself or herself.
Don Rubin has told me that scientists are funda-
mentally Bayesian (even if they do not realize it), in
that they interpret uncertainty intervals Bayesianly.
Brad Efron has talked vividly about how his sci-
entific collaborators find permutation tests and p-
values to be the most convincing form of evidence.
Judea Pearl assures me that graphical models de-
scribe how people really think about causality. And
so on. I am sure that all these accomplished re-
searchers, and many more, are describing their ex-
periences accurately. Rubin wielding a posterior dis-
tribution is a powerful thing, as is Efron with a per-
mutation test or Pearl with a graphical model, and I
believe that (a) all three can be helping people solve
real scientific problems, and (b) it is natural for their
collaborators to attribute some of these researchers’
creativity to their methods.
The result is that each of us tends to come away
from a collaboration or consulting experience with
the warm feeling that our methods really work, and
that they represent how scientists really think. In
stating this, I am not trying to espouse some sort
of empty pluralism—the claim that, for example,
we would be doing just as well if we were all using
fuzzy sets, or correspondence analysis, or some other
obscure statistical method. There is certainly a rea-
son that methodological advances are made, and this
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reason is typically that existing methods have their
failings. Nonetheless, I think we all have to be careful
about attributing too much from our collaborators’
and clients’ satisfaction with our methods.
My third meta-principle is that different applica-
tions demand different philosophies. This principle
comes up for me in Efron’s discussion of hypothesis
testing and the so-called false discovery rate, which
I label as “so-called” for the following reason. In
Efron’s formulation (which follows the classical mul-
tiple comparisons literature), a “false discovery” is
a zero effect that is identified as nonzero, whereas,
in my own work, I never study zero effects. The ef-
fects I study are sometimes small but it would be
silly, for example, to suppose that the difference in
voting patterns of men and women (after control-
ling for some other variables) could be exactly zero.
My problems with the “false discovery” formulation
are partly a matter of taste, I’m sure, but I believe
they also arise from the difference between problems
in genetics (in which some genes really have essen-
tially zero effects on some traits, so that the classical
hypothesis-testing model is plausible) and in social
science and environmental health (where essentially
everything is connected to everything else, and effect
sizes follow a continuous distribution rather than a
mix of large effects and near-exact zeroes).
To me, the false discovery rate is the latest flavor-
of-the-month attempt to make the Bayesian omelette
without breaking the eggs. As such, it can work fine
if the implicit prior is ok, it can be a great method,
but I really don’t like it as an underlying principle,
as it is all formally based on a hypothesis-testing
framework that, to me, is more trouble than it’s
worth. In thinking about multiple comparisons in
my own research, I prefer to discuss errors of Type
S and Type M rather than Type 1 and Type 2 (Gel-
man and Tuerlinckx, 2000; Gelman and Weakliem,
2009; Gelman, Hill and Yajima, 2009). My point
here, though, is simply that any given statistical
concept will make more sense in some settings than
others.
For another example of how different areas of ap-
plication merit different sorts of statistical thinking,
consider Rob Kass’s remark: “I tell my students in
neurobiology that in claiming statistical significance
I get nervous unless the p-value is much smaller than
0.01.” In political science, we are typically not aim-
ing for that level of uncertainty. (Just to get a sense
of the scale of things, there have been barely 100
national elections in all of U.S. history, and political
scientists studying the modern era typically start in
1946.)
PROGRESS IN PARAMETRIC BAYESIAN
INFERENCE
I also think that Efron is doing parametric Bayesian
inference a disservice by focusing on a fun little base-
ball example that he and Morris worked on 35 years
ago. If he would look at what is being done now,
he would see all the good statistical practice that,
in his section 10, he naively (I think) attributes to
“frequentism.” Figure 1 illustrates with a grid of
maps of public opinion by state, estimated from na-
tional survey data. Fitting this model took a lot of
effort which was made possible by working within
a hierarchical regression framework—“a good set of
work rules,” to use Efron’s expression. Similar mod-
els have been used recently to study opinion trends
in other areas such as gay rights in which policy is
made at the state level, and so we want to under-
stand opinions by state as well (Lax and Phillips,
2009).
I also completely disagree with Efron’s claim that
frequentism (whatever that is) is “fundamentally con-
servative.” One thing that “frequentism” absolutely
encourages is for people to use horrible, noisy es-
timates out of a fear of “bias.” More generally, as
discussed by Gelman and Jakulin (2007), Bayesian
inference is conservative in that it goes with what is
already known, unless the new data force a change.
In contrast, unbiased estimates and other unregu-
larized classical procedures are noisy and get jerked
around by whatever data happen to come by—not
really a conservative thing at all. To make this ar-
gument more formal, consider the multiple compar-
isons problem. Classical unbiased comparisons are
noisy and must be adjusted to avoid overinterpre-
tation; in contrast, hierarchical Bayes estimates of
comparisons are conservative (when two parameters
are pulled toward a common mean, their difference
is pulled toward zero) and less likely to appear to
be statistically significant (Gelman and Tuerlinckx,
2000).
Another way to understand this is to consider
the “machine learning” problem of estimating the
probability of an event on which we have very lit-
tle direct data. The most conservative stance is to
assign a probability of 1
2
; the next-conservative ap-
proach might be to use some highly smoothed es-
timate based on averaging a large amount of data;
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Fig. 1. Estimated proportion of voters in each state who support federal spending on school vouchers, broken down by
religion/ethnicity and income categories. The estimates come from a hierarchical Bayesian analysis fit to data from the
National Annenberg Election Survey, adjusted to population and voter turnout data from the U.S. Census.
and the unbiased estimate based on the local data
is hardly conservative at all! Figure 1 illustrates our
conservative estimate of public opinion on school
vouchers. We prefer this to a noisy, implausible map
of unbiased estimators.
Of course, frequentism is a big tent and can be
interpreted to include all sorts of estimates, up to
and including whatever Bayesian thing I happen to
be doing this week—to make any estimate “frequen-
tist,” one just needs to do whatever combination of
theory and simulation is necessary to get a sense of
my method’s performance under repeated sampling.
So maybe Efron and I are in agreement in practice,
that any method is worth considering if it works, but
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it might take some work to see if something really
does indeed work.
COMMENTS ON KASS’S COMMENTS
Before writing this discussion, I also had the op-
portunity to read Rob Kass’s comments on Efron’s
article.
I pretty much agree with Kass’s points, except
for his claim that most of Bayes is essentially max-
imum likelihood estimation. Multilevel modeling is
only approximately maximum likelihood if you fol-
low Efron and Morris’s empirical Bayesian formula-
tion in which you average over intermediate parame-
ters and maximize over hyperparameters, as I gather
Kass has in mind. But then this makes “maximum
likelihood” a matter of judgment: what exactly is
a hyperparameter? Things get tricky with mixture
models and the like. I guess what I’m saying is that
maximum likelihood, like many classical methods,
works pretty well in practice only because practi-
tioners interpret the methods flexibly and do not do
the really stupid versions (such as joint maximiza-
tion of parameters and hyperparameters) that are
allowed by the theory.
Regarding the difficulties of combining evidence
across species (in Kass’s discussion of the DuMouchel
and Harris paper), one point here is that this works
best when the parameters have a real-world mean-
ing. This is a point that became clear to me in my
work in toxicology (Gelman, Bois and Jiang, 1996):
when you have a model whose parameters have nu-
merical interpretations (“mean,” “scale,”
“curvature,” and so forth), it can be hard to get use-
ful priors for them, but when the parameters have
substantive interpretations (“blood flow,” “equilib-
rium concentration,” etc.), then this opens the door
for real prior information. And, in a hierarchical con-
text, “real prior information” does not have to mean
a specific, pre-assigned prior; rather, it can refer to
a model in which the parameters have a group-level
distribution. The more real-worldy the parameters
are, the more likely this group-level distribution can
be modeled accurately. And the smaller the group-
level error, the more partial pooling you will get and
the more effective your Bayesian inference is. To me,
this is the real connection between scientific model-
ing and the mechanics of Bayesian smoothing, and
Kass alludes to some of this in the final paragraph
of his comment.
Hal Stern once said that the big divide in statis-
tics is not between Bayesians and non-Bayesians but
rather between modelers and non-modelers. And,
indeed, in many of my Bayesian applications, the
big benefit has come from the likelihood. But some-
times that is because we are careful in deciding what
part of the model is “the likelihood.” Nowadays, this
is starting to have real practical consequences even
in Bayesian inference, with methods such as DIC,
Bayes factors, and posterior predictive checks, all of
whose definitions depend crucially on how the model
is partitioned into likelihood, prior, and hyperprior
distributions.
On one hand, I am impressed by modern machine-
learning methods that process huge datasets with I
agree with Kass’s concluding remarks that empha-
size how important it can be that the statistical
methods be connected with minimal assumptions;
on the other hand, I appreciate Kass’s concluding
point that statistical methods are most powerful
when they are connected to the particular substan-
tive question being studied. I agree that statistical
theory is far from settled, and I agree with Kass that
developments in Bayesian modeling are a promising
way to move forward.
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